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FIL-54-95 Attachment

[Federal Register: August 2, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 148)]

[Rules and Regulations]

[Page 39489-39494]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]




 

[[Page 39489]]


 

_______________________________________________________________________


 

Part II


 

Department of the Treasury

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency




 

12 CFR Part 3


 

Federal Reserve System




 

12 CFR Part 208


 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation




 

12 CFR Part 325




 

_______________________________________________________________________




 

Risk-Based Capital Standards; Interest Rate Risk; Final Rule and

Proposed Rule



 

[[Page 39490]]



 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY


 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency


 

12 CFR Part 3


 

[Docket No. 95-17]


 

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


 

12 CFR Part 208


 

[Docket No. R-0802]


 

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


 

12 CFR Part 325


 

RIN 3064-AB22


 

 

Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk


 

agencies: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Treasury;

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); and Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).


 

action: Final rule.


 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------


 

summary: The OCC, the Board, and the FDIC (collectively referred to as

the banking agencies) are issuing this final rule to implement the

portion of Section 305 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) that requires the banking agencies to

revise their risk-based capital standards to ensure that those

standards take adequate account of interest rate risk. This final rule

amends the capital standards to specify that the banking agencies will

include, in their evaluations of a bank's capital adequacy, an

assessment of the exposure to declines in the economic value of the

bank's capital due to changes in interest rates.

Concurrent with the publication of this final rule, the banking

agencies are issuing for comment, a joint policy statement that

describes the process the banking agencies will use to measure and

assess the exposure of a bank's net economic value to changes in

interest rates. After the banking agencies and banking industry gain

sufficient experience with the proposed measurement process, the

banking agencies intend, through a subsequent rulemaking process, to

issue a proposed rule that would establish an explicit capital charge

for interest rate risk that will be based upon the level of a bank's

measured interest rate risk exposure.


 

effective date: September 1, 1995.


 

for further information contact:

OCC: Christina Benson, Capital Markets Specialist, or Lisa

Lintecum, National Bank Examiner (202/874-5070), Office of the Chief

National Bank Examiner; Michael Carhill, Financial Economist, Risk

Analysis Division (202/874-5700); and Ronald Shimabukuro, Senior

Attorney, Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division (202/874-

5090), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E Street SW.,

Washington, DC 20219.

Board of Governors: James Houpt, Assistant Director (202/452-3358),

William F. Treacy, Supervisory Financial Analyst (202/452-3859),

Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation; Gregory Baer, Managing

Senior Counsel (202/452-3236), Legal Division, Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System. For the hearing impaired only,

Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD), Dorothea Thompson (202/

452-3544), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C

Streets NW., Washington, DC 20551.

FDIC: William A. Stark, Assistant Director (202/898-6972) or

Phillip J. Bond, Senior Capital Markets Specialist (202/898-3519),

Division of Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550

17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:


 

I. Background


 

Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank's current and future

earnings and equity capital arising from adverse movements in interest

rates. This risk results from the possibility that changes in interest

rates may have an adverse impact on a bank's earnings and its

underlying economic value. Changes in interest rates affect a bank's

earnings by changing its net interest income and the level of other

interest-sensitive income and operating expenses. The underlying

economic value of the bank's assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet

items also are affected by changes in interest rates. These changes

occur because the present value of future cash flows, and in some cases

the cash flows themselves, change when interest rates change. The

combined effects of the changes in these present values reflect the

change in the underlying economic value of the bank's capital as well

as provide an indicator of the expected change in the bank's future

earnings arising from the change in interest rates.

Interest rate risk is inherent in the role of banks as financial

intermediaries. Interest rate risk, however, introduces volatility to

bank earnings and to the economic value of the bank. A bank that has an

excessive level of interest rate risk can face diminished future

earnings, impaired liquidity and capital positions, and, ultimately,

may jeopardize its solvency.

Section 305 of FDICIA, Pub. L. 102-242 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note),

requires the banking agencies to revise their risk-based capital

guidelines to take adequate account of interest rate risk. Section 305

of FDICIA also requires the banking agencies to publish final

implementing regulations by June 19, 1993, and to establish transition

rules to facilitate compliance with those regulations.

The banking agencies have not met the June 19, 1993, statutory date

for publishing a final rule for this section of FDICIA. This delay

reflects the difficult tradeoffs the banking agencies have faced in

developing and implementing a rule that provides a sufficiently

accurate basis for estimating banks' interest rate risk exposures and

their need for capital, yet maintains enough transparency and

simplicity to allow bank management to readily determine their

regulatory capital requirements. The banking agencies also are mindful

of the need to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens associated with

this rule, consistent with Section 335 of the Reigle Community

Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325 (12

U.S.C. 1828 note).


 

II. September 1993 Proposal


 

A. Proposal


 

In September 1993, the banking agencies issued a proposed rule that

solicited comments on a framework for measuring banks' interest rate

risk exposures and determining the amount of capital needed by a bank

to account for interest rate risk. See 58 FR 48206 (September 14,

1993).

The framework outlined by the banking agencies in the September

1993 proposed rule incorporated the use of a three-level measurement

process to evaluate banks' interest rate risk exposures. The first

measure was a quantitative screen, based on existing Consolidated

Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) information, that would

exempt potential low risk banks from additional reporting requirements.

The exemption screen was based on two criteria: (1) the amount of a

bank's off-balance sheet interest rate contracts in relation to its

total assets, and (2) the relation between a bank's fixed- and

floating-rate loans and securities that mature or reprice beyond five

years and its total capital.

Banks not meeting the proposed exemption test would have been

required to calculate their economic exposure by either: (1) a

supervisory


 

[[Page 39491]]

model that measured the change in the economic value of the bank for a

specified change in interest rates; or (2) the bank's own interest rate

risk model, provided that the model was deemed adequate by examiners

for the nature and scope of the bank's activities and that it measured

the bank's economic exposure using the interest rate scenarios

specified by the banking agencies.

The September 1993 proposed rule also sought comment on two

alternative methods for determining the amount of capital a bank may

need for interest rate risk. Both approaches proposed to focus

supervisory attention and need for capital on those banks whose

measured exposure exceeded a proposed supervisory threshold level.\1\

One method (Minimum Capital Standard) proposed to establish an explicit

minimum capital standard for interest rate risk. This approach would

have relied on the results of either the supervisory model or banks'

own models and would have required banks to have capital sufficient to

cover the amount by which their measured exposure exceeded a

supervisory threshold level. The second approach (Risk Assessment)

proposed to use model results as one of several factors that examiners

would consider when determining a bank's capital needs for interest

rate risk. Under this approach, a bank's need for capital would be

determined on a case-by-case basis as part of each banking agency's

examination process. In determining the need for capital, examiners

would consider the quality of the bank's interest rate risk management,

internal controls and the overall financial condition of the bank.

Banks that had measured exposures in excess of the supervisory

threshold and weak interest rate risk management systems would

generally be required to hold additional capital for interest rate

risk.


 

\1\ A threshold level representing a decline in economic value

equal to 1.0 percent of assets was proposed by the banking agencies.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


 

B. Comments

The banking agencies collectively received a total of 133 comments

on the September 1993 proposed rule. The majority of commenters were

banks. Thrifts, trade associations, bank consultants, other government-

sponsored agencies and other regulators also commented. The majority of

commenters responded favorably to modifications that the banking

agencies made from the earlier advance notice of proposed rulemaking

published in the Federal Register on August 10, 1992. See 57 FR 35507

(August 10, 1992). In particular, most commenters expressed strong

support for using the results of banks' own interest rate risk models

to determine their levels of exposure and corresponding need for

capital. Commenters noted the potential inaccuracies of standardized

regulatory models, such as the proposed supervisory model, as one

reason for allowing the use of internal models. Internal models, they

believed, would better capture the unique characteristics of individual

bank portfolios. Many commenters also stated that permitting the use of

internal models would provide banks with incentives to improve their

internal risk measurement systems.

The vast majority of commenters also urged the banking agencies to

adopt a ``Risk Assessment'' approach for determining capital adequacy.

Among the reasons cited for this approach were concerns about the

accuracy of the proposed supervisory model and the need to consider

qualitative factors, such as the quality of a bank's risk management

process and its ability to respond to changing market conditions, in

evaluating capital. Many commenters believed that by considering such

factors, the banking agencies would reward banks that have superior

risk management capabilities.

Some commenters believed that the banking agencies' primary focus

when evaluating the level of a bank's interest rate risk exposure

should be on the exposure of the bank's near-term (one- to two-year)

reported earnings, rather than on its exposure to economic value. While

recognizing the importance of understanding the degree to which a

bank's reported earnings are vulnerable to changing interest rates, the

banking agencies have concluded that the economic value perspective

more effectively identifies the risks that the bank's current business

activities pose to its financial condition, its longer-term earnings

and solvency, and hence the adequacy of its capital levels. Economic

value measures the effect of a change in interest rates on the value of

all future cash flows generated by a bank's current financial

instruments, not just those that affect earnings over the next few

months or quarters. Indeed, an earnings analysis provides information

only on positions repricing within the forecast horizon, and thus would

not take account of the full magnitude of risk. As a result, the effect

of embedded and explicit options can be significantly understated by

such an analysis. In contrast, an economic value perspective captures

the effect of changing interest rates for all time periods, and offers

a superior vehicle for assessing the effect of those rate changes on

positions that have option characteristics. In addition, an economic

value perspective offers important insights into the effect of changing

interest rates on the liquidity of a bank's assets.

Many commenters also raised common concerns about various elements

of the measurement process outlined in the September 1993 proposed

rule. Most commenters believe that the proposed treatment of non-

maturity deposits understate their effective maturity. Others raised

concerns about the accuracy of the proposed supervisory model and the

appropriateness of the proposed exemption test criteria. The

measurement system, proposed in today's joint policy statement,

includes a discussion of these comments and incorporates a number of

changes to the September 1993 proposed rule in response to commenters'

concerns.


 

III. Final Rule and Two-Step Process for Establishing Minimum Capital

Standards


 

After careful consideration of all the comments, the banking

agencies have decided to implement minimum capital standards for

interest rate risk exposures in a two-step process.

This final rule implements the first step of that process by

revising the capital standards of the banking agencies to explicitly

include a bank's exposure to declines in the economic value of its

capital due to changes in interest rates as a factor that the banking

agencies will consider in evaluating a bank's capital adequacy.\2\ This

final rule does not codify a measurement framework for assessing the

level of a bank's interest rate risk exposure. The information and

exposure estimates collected through a new proposed supervisory

measurement process, described in the banking agencies' joint policy

statement on interest rate risk, would be one quantitative factor used

by examiners to determine the adequacy of an individual bank's capital

for interest rate risk. The focus of that proposed process is on a

bank's economic value exposure. Other quantitative factors that

examiners will consider include the bank's historical financial

performance and its earnings exposure to interest rate movements.

Examiners also will consider qualitative


 

[[Page 39492]]

factors, including the adequacy of the bank's internal interest rate

risk management. Consistent with each banking agency's safety and

soundness guidelines, the banking agencies expect a bank to properly

manage all of its risks, including its interest rate risk, in a manner

commensurate with its risk profile. Nothing in this rule is intended to

diminish the importance or need for a bank to have an effective risk

management system.


 

\2\ The exposure of a bank's economic value is generally the

change in the present value of its assets, less the change in the

present value of its liabilities, plus the change in the value of

its interest rate off-balance-sheet contracts. It represents the

change in the underlying economic value of the bank's capital.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


 

This final rule represents the banking agencies' adoption of the

Risk Assessment approach described in the September 1993 proposed rule

with the exception that, unlike that proposed rule, this final rule

does not establish an explicit supervisory threshold that defines

whether a bank had an above ``normal'' level of interest rate risk

exposure. The banking agencies have concluded that it is appropriate to

first collect industry data and to evaluate the level of interest rate

risk exposure in the banking industry before establishing an explicit

supervisory threshold above which capital would be required. It is

important to note, however, that the banking agencies intend for this

case-by-case approach for assessing a bank's capital adequacy for

interest rate risk to be a transitional arrangement.

The second step of the banking agencies' process will be to issue a

proposed rule that would establish an explicit minimum capital charge

for interest rate risk, based on the level of bank's measured interest

rate risk exposure. The banking agencies anticipate that the proposed

policy statement on the supervisory assessment of interest rate risk

will provide the foundation for the proposed rule that would propose

the establishment of an explicit minimum capital requirement. The

banking agencies will implement this second step at some future date,

through a subsequent and separate proposed rule after the banking

agencies and the banking industry have gained more experience with the

proposed supervisory measurement and assessment process.

During the transitional period before the second rulemaking process

is initiated, the banking agencies will work with the industry to

determine what, if any, further modifications to the proposed

measurement process are warranted. Such modifications may include

further refinements to the supervisory model and to other criteria used

by examiners to evaluate the adequacy of banks' internal models. The

transition period also allows the banking agencies to collect and

monitor more rigorous and consistent information on the level of banks'

interest rate risk exposures. This experience and information will

assist the banking agencies in formulating a proposed rule for explicit

minimum capital standards for interest rate risk.

Second 305(b)(2) of FDICIA requires the banking agencies to discuss

the development of comparable standards with members of the supervisory

committee of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The Basle

Committee on Banking Supervision, under the auspices of the BIS, has

been working on ways to incorporate interest rate risk into the Basle

Accord on risk-based capital standards. See International Convergence

of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988). The banking

agencies are participating actively in that international effort.

However, the timing of any international standard for monitoring and

assessing capital for interest rate risk is uncertain. Given the

importance of interest rate risk to the safety and soundness of the

banking industry and the mandate of section 305 of FDICIA, the banking

agencies have concluded that they should not delay the implementation

of this rule and measurement process until an international standard is

achieved. The banking agencies will continue to work with international

organizations to develop consistent international capital standards. At

the time that an international agreement emerges on either a

measurement system or explicit minimum capital standard, the banking

agencies will revisit their rules in light of the international

standard.


 

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Statement


 

Each banking agency has concluded after reviewing the final

regulations that the regulations, if adopted, will not impose a

significant economic hardship on small institutions. The final rules do

not necessitate the development of sophisticated recordkeeping or

reporting systems by small institutions nor will small institutions

need to seek out the expertise of specialized accountants, lawyers, or

managers in order to comply with the regulation. Each banking agency

therefore hereby certifies pursuant to section 605b of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605b) that the final rule will not have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities

within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et

seq.).


 

V. Executive Order 12866


 

The Comptroller of the Currency has determined that this final rule

is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.


 

VI. OCC Response to Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995


 

Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 (Unfunded Mandates

Act) (signed into law on March 22, 1995) requires that an agency

prepare a budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule that

includes a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by state,

local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private

sector, of $100 million or more in any one year. If a budgetary impact

statement is required, section 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Act also

requires an agency to identify and consider a reasonable number of

regulatory alternatives before promulgating a rule. Because the OCC has

determined that this final rule will not result in expenditures by

state, local and tribal governments, or by the private sector, of more

than $100 million in any one year, the OCC has not prepared a budgetary

impact statement or specifically addressed the regulatory alternatives

considered. As discussed in the preamble, this final rule will clarify

the authority of the OCC to require additional capital for any

significant exposure to declines in the economic value due to changes

in interest rates. Under the proposed joint policy statement, the

supervisory model and internal bank models will serve as supervisory

tools to assist examiners in assessing capital adequacy. Any decision

to require additional capital will be made on a case-by-case basis as

prescribed under the current capital procedures.


 

List of Subjects


 

OCC


 

12 CFR Part 3


 

Administrative practice and procedure, Capital risk, National

banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.


 

Board

12 CFR Part 208


 

Accounting, Agriculture, Banks, banking, Confidential business

information, Crime, Federal Reserve System, Mortgages, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Securities.


 

FDIC


 

12 CFR Part 325


 

Bank deposit insurance, Banks, banking, Capital adequacy, Reporting

and recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations, State nonmember

banks.


 

[[Page 39493]]



 

Comptroller of the Currency


 

12 CFR Chapter I


 

Authority and Issuance


 

For the reasons set forth in the joint preamble, part 3 of chapter

I of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as set

forth below.


 

PART 3--MINIMUM CAPITAL RATIOS; ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVES


 

1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:


 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1818, 1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n

note, 1835, 3907, and 3909.


 

2. Section 3.10 is revised to read as follows:



 

Sec. 3.10 Applicability.


 

The OCC may require higher minimum capital ratios for an individual

bank in view of its circumstances. For example, higher capital ratios

may be appropriate for:

(a) A newly chartered bank;

(b) A bank receiving special supervisory attention;

(c) A bank that has, or is expected to have, losses resulting in

capital inadequacy;

(d) A bank with significant exposure due to the risks from

concentrations of credit, certain risks arising from nontraditional

activities, or management's overall inability to monitor and control

financial and operating risks presented by concentrations of credit and

nontraditional activities;

(e) A bank with significant exposure to declines in the economic

value of its capital due to changes in interest rates;

(f) A bank with significant exposure due to fiduciary or

operational risk;

(g) A bank exposed to a high degree of asset depreciation, or a low

level of liquid assets in relation to short term liabilities;

(h) A bank exposed to a high volume or, or particularly severe,

problem loans;

(i) A bank that is growing rapidly, either internally or through

acquisitions; or

(j) A bank that may be adversely affected by the activities or

condition of its holding company, affiliate(s), or other persons or

institutions including chain banking organizations, with which it has

significant business relationships.

3. In appendix A to part 3, section 1, paragraph (b)(1) is revised

to read as follows:


 

Appendix A to Part 3--Risk-Based Capital Guidelines


 

* * * * *

Section 1 * * * (b) * * * (1) The risk-based capital ratio

derived from these guidelines is an important factor in the OCC's

evaluation of a bank's capital adequacy. However, since this measure

addresses only credit risk, the 8% minimum ratio should not be

viewed as the level to be targeted, but rather as a floor. The final

supervisory judgment on a bank's capital adequacy is based on an

individualized assessment of numerous factors, including those

listed in 12 CFR 3.10. With respect to the consideration of these

factors, the OCC will give particular attention to any bank with

significant exposure to declines in the economic value of its

capital due to changes in interest rates. As a result, it may differ

from the conclusion drawn from an isolated comparison of a bank's

risk-based capital ration to the 8% minimum specified in these

guidelines. In addition to the standards established by these risk-

based capital guidelines, all national banks must maintain a minimum

capital-to-total assets ratio in accordance with the provisions of

12 CFR part 3.

* * * * *


 

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency


 

Dated: June 29, 1995.

Eugene A. Ludwig,

Comptroller of the Currency.

Federal Reserve System


 

12 CFR Chapter II


 

Authority and Issuance


 

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, part 208 of chapter II

of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as set forth

below:


 

PART 208--MEMBERSHIP OF STATE BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL

RESERVE SYSTEM (REGULATION H)


 

1. The authority citation for Part 208 revised to read as follows:


 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 36, 248(a), 248(c), 321-338a, 371d, 461,

481-486, 601, 611, 1814, 1823(j), 1828)(o), 1831o, 1831p-1, 3105,

3310, 3331-3351, and 3906-3909; 15 U.S.C. 78b, 781(b), 781(g),

781(i), 78o-4(c)(5), 78q, 78q-1, and 78w; 31 U.S.C. 5318.


 

2. Appendix A to part 208 is amended by revising the fifth and

sixth paragraphs under ``I. Overview'' to read as follows:


 

Appendix A to Part 1208--Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State

Member Banks: Risk-Based Measure


 

I. Overview


 

* * * * *

The risk-based capital ratio focuses principally on broad

categories of credit risk, although the framework for assigning

assets and off-balance-sheet items to risk categories does

incorporate elements of transfer risk, as well as limited instances

of interest rate and market risk. The framework incorporates risks

arising from traditional banking activities as well as risks arising

from nontraditional activities. The risk-based ratio does not,

however, incorporate other factors that can affect an institution's

financial condition. These factors include overall interest-rate

exposure; liquidity, funding and market risks; the quality and level

of earnings; investment, loan portfolio, and other concentrations of

credit; certain risks arising from nontraditional activities; the

quality of loans and investments; the effectiveness of loan and

investment policies; and management's overall ability to monitor and

control financial and operating risks, including the risks presented

by concentrations of credit and nontraditional activities.

In addition to evaluating capital ratios, an overall assessment

of capital adequacy must take account of those factors, including,

in particular, the level and severity of problem and classified

assets as well as a bank's exposure to declines in the economic

value of its capital due to changes in interest rates. For this

reason, the final supervisory judgment on a bank's capital adequacy

may differ significantly from conclusions that might be drawn solely

from the level of its risk-based capital ratio.

* * * * *

By Order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System.


 

Dated: July 7, 1995.

William W. Wiles,

Secretary of Board.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation


 

12 CFR Chapter III


 

Authority and Issuance


 

For the reasons set forth in the joint preamble, part 325 of

chapter III of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended

as set forth below:


 

PART 325--CAPITAL MAINTENANCE


 

1. The authority citation for part 325 continues to read as

follows:


 

Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b),

1818(c), 1818(t), 1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n),

1828(o), 1831o, 3907, 3909, 4808; Pub. L. 102-233, 105 Stat. 1761,

1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236,

2355, 2386 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note).


 

2. In appendix A to part 325, the fifth undesignated paragraph of

the introductory text is revised to read as follows:


 

Appendix A to Part 325--Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital


 

* * * * *

The risk-based capital ratio focuses principally on broad

categories of credit risk, however, the ratio does not take account

of many other factors that can affect a bank's financial condition.

These factors include


 

[[Page 39494]]

overall interest rate risk exposure, liquidity, funding and market

risks; the quality and level of earnings; investment, loan

portfolio, and other concentrations of credit risk, certain risks

arising from nontraditional activities; the quality of loans and

investments; the effectiveness of loan and investment policies; and

management's overall ability to monitor and control financial and

operating risks, including the risk presented by concentrations of

credit and nontraditional activities. In addition to evaluating

capital ratios, an overall assessment of capital adequacy must take

account of each of these other factors, including, in particular,

the level and severity of problem and adversely classified assets as

well as a bank's interest rate risk as measured by the bank's

exposure to declines in the economic value of its capital due to

changes in interest rates. For this reason, the final supervisory

judgment on a bank's capital adequacy may differ significantly from

the conclusions that might be drawn solely from the absolute level

of the bank's risk-based capital ratio.


 

By order of the Board of Directors.


 

Dated at Washington, D.C. this 27th day of June, 1995.


 

Federal deposit Insurance Corporation.

Jerry L. Langley,

Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 95-18098 Filed 8-1-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODES 4810-33-M, 6210-01-M, 6714-01-M

Last Updated: March 24, 2024