|
Oral Statement
Ricki Helfer
Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
before the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services
U.S. House of Representatives
March 13, 1996
Thank you, Chairman Leach, Congressman LaFalce and members of the
Committee, for this opportunity to present the views of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on how insured depository
institutions are assessing and managing risk and to discuss the
ways that the FDIC is working to make our risk assessment processes
more effective. I have detailed written testimony to submit for
the record and will, this morning, briefly describe our risk
assessment effort.
That effort has never been more important. Innovations in
technology and information systems, financial delivery systems, and
new financial products and activities provide new opportunities for
risk-taking and for increasing the level of risk exposure. We are
discovering that the underlying risks in banking, even the new
"emerging" ones, remain largely unchanged, but technological and
other innovations in products and the delivery of services have
vastly accelerated the flow of risks through the system. Our risk
assessment procedures are constantly being evaluated and refined to
keep pace with these important developments.
I want to make three important points today:
Point number one:
The programs and approaches described in my
testimony today do not reflect a fundamental change in the FDIC's
traditional approach to risk assessment -- they are designed
instead to enhance that approach. Our goal is to use common sense,
together with available data, experience and expertise, to help
banks and thrifts in their efforts to respond to existing and
emerging risks. Recent developments in supervision recognize that
it is the responsibility of each insured financial institution to
assure that it has internal controls in place to monitor and
control the risks to which the institution is exposed.
Historically, the FDIC has supported safe and sound supervisory
efforts that focus on identifying risks and their underlying causes
within the structure of the CAMEL rating system, but the approach
in the past has been somewhat static. A more dynamic approach to
risk assessment will take into account the variety of risks within
each CAMEL component and the effectiveness of internal controls, as
well as perhaps new components to CAMEL -- such as market risk or
interest rate risk -- where special attention is required.
Disclosing the components of CAMEL to the managements and boards of
directors of banks would be beneficial because it would add more
discipline to the rating process -- requiring examiners to justify
the component ratings for each institution -- and it would give
bank managements and boards of directors more direction on specific
supervisory concerns before a composite rating declines. As part
of this process, the FDIC will continue to work on the interagency
effort to refine the CAMEL system.
Point number two:
the key to enhancing our risk assessment
programs is our ability to leverage existing statistical and
analytical resources, both within and outside the FDIC. We have a
treasury of data on the banking and thrift industries that we and
our sister agencies testifying today have generated, including a
data base the FDIC is developing on the causes of the large number
of failing and failed institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s.
We have created a Division of Insurance to analyze risks to the
insurance funds from a more comprehensive perspective.
Our goal is to "bridge the gap" that currently separates the
"macro" perspective of economics and market trends from the "micro"
perspective of bank examinations in ways that will translate data
into guidance that examiners can use in assessing and monitoring
risks and internal controls in institutions with differing levels
and types of risk exposure.
We are using the data that we gather to design a more diagnostic
and graduated approach to bank examinations -- keyed to the level
of risk and the quality of internal controls in individual
institutions through the use of decision charts. This will
result in examinations tailored to the risks an institution
presents and a more accurate assessment of an institution's ability
to manage its risks.
The information we collect on risk will provide a basis for notices
to banks on trends that may affect the way they do business. We
want to help banks respond to changing circumstances before
problems arise.
Point number three:
We are analyzing our existing approach to
supervision and finding ways to improve it. We are improving pre-
examination planning techniques to make examinations more effective
and more efficient. We are creating the position of case manager
-- examiners who will specialize in specific institutions and who
will review all off-site data and regulatory findings concerning
individual banks to assess the risks posed to the insurance fund.
In addition, we are creating risk specialists on our examination
staff -- experts who will assist other examiners in analyzing
complex transactions and activities in emerging risk areas,
including capital markets investments and accounting, sales of
nondeposit investment products and interest rate risk -- and the
internal controls for monitoring those risks. We are also creating
a unit to focus efforts more directly on risks in international
banking activities.
In conclusion, we will continue to increase our ability to
identify, measure, and monitor the risks in the banking system --
and the internal controls that institutions are required to have in
place to address those risks -- from the familiar risks that travel
through traditional brick-and-mortar institutions to the exotic
risks that arise from the technological super-highway. By
improving what we do, we all benefit from keeping banks open and
operating safely and soundly so that they can continue to serve
their communities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman LaFalce and members of the
committee, I would be happy to address your questions.
Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on the assessment
and management of risk by insured depository institutions and to
discuss the ways that the FDIC is working to make our risk
assessment processes more effective. The FDIC brings a unique
perspective to this issue as deposit insurer, federal supervisor
of state nonmember banks and savings institutions, and receiver
for failed depository institutions. This perspective is enriched
by the treasury of historical and current data on the banking and
thrift industries that we have generated with our sister
agencies, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the
Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision. In addition, our
wealth of economic and analytical expertise provides us with
valuable tools to assist banks and thrifts in their ongoing
efforts to identify, measure, monitor and control risks.
The programs and approaches that I will describe in my
testimony today do not reflect a fundamental change in the FDIC's
traditional approach to risk assessment -- they are designed
instead to enhance that approach. Our goal is to use common
sense, together with available data, experience and expertise, to
help banks and thrifts in their efforts to respond to existing
and emerging risks. Our path is two-fold. First, we are working
to "bridge the gap" that currently separates the "macro"
perspective of economics and market trends from the "micro"
perspective of bank examinations in ways that will translate data
into guidance that examiners can use in assessing and monitoring
risks in institutions with differing levels and types of risk
exposure. Second, we are using the data that we gather to design
a more diagnostic and structured approach to bank examinations in
the future. This approach will combine the observations and
factual findings from our analytical methods with technological
innovations. The result will be a more effective and accurate
assessment of an institution's ability to manage its risks within
a structured framework, which will enhance safety and soundness
-- and one that promotes communication between the FDIC and the
management and boards of directors of the institutions that it
supervises. I will describe these efforts in more detail below.
Changes in the Business of Banking and Emerging Risks
The business of banking is becoming increasingly complex,
and the competitive landscape is undergoing rapid change. The
nature and scope of risk within the banking and financial
services industry is changing as a result.
Innovations in technology and information systems, financial
delivery systems, and new financial products and activities
provide novel opportunities for risk-taking, as well as for risk
management. The explosive growth in the use of personal
computers, the Internet and the World Wide Web, and on-line
banking services, as well as the development of innovative
payment and settlement systems, also present challenges and
opportunities to the banking industry with regard to risk. While
the types of risks presented by these new developments are
largely familiar, such as credit risk, interest rate risk and
market risk, these innovations have altered the nature and scope
of the risks faced by the banking industry and the deposit
insurance funds as well as the speed with which risk exposures
can change.
The growth of trading activities and off-balance-sheet
transactions, such as derivatives, highlights the rapidly
changing nature of risk within the financial-services industry.
Figure 1 shows how rapidly the notional amount of off-balance-
sheet derivative products at insured commercial banks has grown
in the past four years, from $7.3 trillion to $16.9 trillion.
Trading gains and fee income attributable to off-balance-sheet
derivatives activities also have exhibited volatility during the
last nine quarters, ranging from as much as $2.6 billion to as
little as $1.1 billion.
[Figures 1-5 are available from the FDIC Public Information Center,
801 17th Street N.W., Room 100, Washington, DC, 20434,
phone (202) 416-6940.]
The need for effective supervisory measures to address these
banking risks has become even more pronounced as insured
institutions have confronted increased competition from non-banks
in recent years. Commercial banks' share of domestic financial-
sector assets has fallen from 40 percent in the mid-1970s to 25
percent at mid-year 1995 (Figure 2). Meanwhile, commercial paper
and finance company loans increasingly have substituted for bank
loans as funding vehicles for businesses. In 1980, the combined
dollar amount of business loans made by finance companies and
commercial paper issued by non-financial firms was just 30
percent of the dollar amount of commercial and industrial loans
from commercial banks; at mid-year 1995, this figure exceeded 80
percent (Figures 3 and 4).
Insured institutions also face increasing competition from
these non-bank firms for deposit funds. At year-end 1980, for
example, investments in money-market mutual funds totaled only 16
percent of the amount invested in small time and savings deposits
at commercial banks but, by mid-year 1995, this figure was
approaching 50 percent (Figure 5).
This intense competition among insured institutions and
other financial firms continues in the midst of rapid industry
consolidation, interstate expansion of banking operations, and
the rise of electronic banking. We recognize that our responses
to these challenges will require innovative methods as well. Our
risk assessment procedures are constantly being evaluated and
refined to keep pace with these important changes.
BRIDGING THE GAP: ENHANCING EXISTING RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS
We believe that the key to enhancing our risk assessment
programs is our ability to leverage existing statistical and
analytical resources, both within and outside the FDIC. By
"bridging the gap" between macro economic and market trends and
the micro perspective of individual bank examinations, we can use
these resources to help examiners focus their efforts on
conducting the most effective examination possible. We will
provide a structure within which consistent guidance can be given
to our examiners as they assess the levels and types of risk.
Examiners will stay on site only as long as necessary to address
the risks that individual institutions present. The information
we collect on risk also will provide a basis for notices to banks
on economic and other macro trends that may affect the way that
institutions do business and help them respond to changing
circumstances before problems arise. We have a number of
initiatives underway that are designed to help in this regard.
Division of Insurance
As a first step in bridging the gap between the macro and
micro concerns, I recently created a new division within the FDIC
to enhance the FDIC's ability to analyze risks to the insurance
funds from a more comprehensive perspective. The new Division of
Insurance will identify and monitor emerging and existing risks
by drawing on a wide variety of sources of information from the
FDIC, other bank regulatory agencies, other government
information and statistics, and analyses and data from the
private sector related to economic, financial and banking trends.
Today, an abundance of such "macro" information is available.
The Division of Insurance will analyze this information from the
unique perspective of the deposit insurer and translate the
results into specific, useful guidance for examiners and
financial analysts, senior FDIC managers, bankers, and others who
monitor banking trends.
To bridge the gap effectively, it is essential to establish
a two-way flow of information between analysts and economists in
the Division of Insurance and examiners in the field.
Examinations will be more effective to the extent that the
Division of Insurance provides guidance based upon timely
analyses of relevant trends and business conditions affecting the
institutions to be examined. The Division of Insurance will be
more effective in identifying relevant trends and conditions to the extent that examiners convey, on a timely basis, what they
are observing during the examination process.
The Division of Insurance will work closely with FDIC
research economists and banking analysts, as well as with the
staffs of other divisions of the FDIC and other bank regulatory
agencies, along with economists and analysts in the private
sector, to identify and address risks in the banking industry.
The Division of Insurance also will analyze economic trends that
warrant further investigation for potential risks to the
insurance funds. To consider some current examples, the FDIC's
most recent Quarterly Banking Profile, which is a quarterly
publication of banking statistics, reported that personal
bankruptcy filings compiled by the American Bankruptcy Institute
have risen sharply over the past year, and may reach the one
million mark for the first time ever during 1996. At the same
time, credit-card balances at commercial banks have been
expanding rapidly, at a growth rate of twelve percent annually
since 1991, and unused credit-card commitments exceeded $1.1
trillion as of December 31, 1995. These trends have been
accompanied by an increase in consumer loan delinquencies over
the past six quarters. As deposit insurer and supervisor, the
FDIC will continue to monitor these trends and is committed to
having the proper resources and systems in place to evaluate such
data thoroughly, and in a timely fashion, in order to provide
useful guidance for bankers, supervisors and policymakers.
Finally, the new Division of Insurance will evaluate the
effectiveness of the risk-based premium system for deposit
insurance on an ongoing basis, explore refinements in response to
new or evolving risks, and consider alternatives as necessary to
ensure that premiums accurately reflect the risks posed to the
insurance funds.
Historical Analysis of Banking Industry Experience
and Macro Economic Data
The FDIC's experience in the 1980s and early 1990s in
dealing with large numbers of failing and failed institutions has
given us a wealth of valuable data on the factors that led to
those failures. Speculation and excessive levels of credit risk,
often influenced by regional and other macroeconomic conditions,
were major contributing factors to the vast majority of these
recent failures -- and they remain critical to our analysis of
risk today. In order to benefit from the lessons of the past, we
are conducting a comprehensive review of our experiences in the
1980s and early 1990s. This study will provide us with
systematic information related to problem institutions, failures
and recoveries. By synthesizing the results of our statistical
research, together with the informed views of market
participants, bank supervisors, policymakers, failed-bank
resolution specialists and other experts, this historical study
will help us gauge the effectiveness of different policies and
procedures that have been applied during the recent past. Inturn, this will help focus our efforts to enhance our offsite
monitoring capabilities, examination procedures, failed-bank
resolution methods, asset disposition strategies and policies to
maintain bank safety and soundness now and in the future.
An effort also is underway at the FDIC to enhance our
failure-prediction capabilities by incorporating indicators of
regional economic conditions and other relevant macroeconomic
information into our failure-prediction models. Economic
conditions clearly played a major role in the waves of bank
failures that swept through the "farm belt," the energy-producing
states and the northeast corridor during the 1980s and early
1990s. Careful analysis of the events that occurred during this
period will provide us with an opportunity to design models that
will employ economic indicators more systematically than has been
done in the past in predictions of bank failures. We also can
use the economic information to design supervisory procedures
that may be taken to avert potential problems sooner. While it
is difficult to predict turning points in the economy with
precision, we will use our experience and expertise to "bridge
the gap" and identify changes in economic conditions that may
signal increased or changed risk exposure to banking institutions
and the insurance funds.
FACING THE FUTURE: ENHANCED RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS
Currently, the FDIC's risk assessment efforts with respect
to examinations incorporate the use of the traditional approach
to examining and supervising individual institutions. This
process includes pre-examination planning, on-site examinations,
offsite monitoring, internal and external audits and other
programs designed to ensure a comprehensive and effective risk
assessment program that can detect poor risk management or
excessive risk-taking by an institution before losses occur. In
each of these areas, the FDIC is working to develop a more
dynamic approach to assessing the risks that are traditionally
evaluated as part of FDIC examinations of financial institutions.
These risks include credit risk, interest rate risk, market risk,
liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputational
risk. This approach integrates risk assessment with the
components of the CAMEL rating system, which establishes a
context for evaluating the performance of individual financial
institutions over time and in relation to their peers. (note 1)
Briefly, I will describe our current supervisory and
examination procedures and highlight how these procedures are
designed to help assess, measure, monitor and control risk.
Next, I will discuss some of the newer initiatives that we are
implementing to improve on these systems and to assess and manage
risk going forward. Each of these new programs is designed to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the FDIC's current
risk assessment efforts and enable us to use all of our available
resources to improve the overall examination structure and the consistency of our assessment of risk. These risk assessment
efforts will increasingly incorporate evaluations on macro or
aggregate risks to the insurance funds by employing the studies
and analyses that I discussed above.
Again, I want to stress that these programs are intended not
to abandon or to alter dramatically our examination philosophy,
policies or procedures, but rather to strengthen and build on
existing procedures in order to conduct a more thorough
assessment of an institutions ability to identify, measure,
monitor and control its risk. Our goal is to develop a system
that provides structure and consistency to the examination
process, while at the same time encouraging examiners to think
analytically rather than adhering to arbitrary checklists.
In implementing these programs, we also want to ensure that
we maintain open lines of communication with an institutions
management and board of directors with respect to risk assessment
issues. We believe that an individual institution's management
and board is in the best position to assess, monitor and manage
its own risk.
Existing Examination Procedures
The FDIC currently uses pre-examination planning procedures
that are designed to identify institution-specific risks
deserving more in-depth, onsite attention. Proper preexamination planning enhances the orderliness and efficiency of
onsite examinations and reduces the burden on institutions by
identifying areas that pose potential risks or problems. (note 2)
Our existing planning process includes an evaluation of
statistical and other data, both public and proprietary, relative
to an institutions condition and performance; (note 3) a review
of potential significant events such as changes in control or
management; an assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of
previously enacted corrective programs, and an evaluation of
pending applications. Through the preparation of a pre-
examination report setting forth the intended scope of the
examination, onsite staffing requirements are minimized,
resulting in a less intrusive process.
Onsite examinations are designed to identify and evaluate
the risks in an institutions capital level, asset type and
quality, level and trend of earnings, liquidity position, and
adequacy of management. Onsite examinations continue to provide
the most effective means of evaluating an institution and the
effectiveness and suitability of its management. The quality of
management is probably the single most important element in the
successful operation of a bank. It is extremely important for
all members of bank management to be aware of the
responsibilities entrusted to them and discharge those responsibilities in a manner that will ensure stability and
soundness of the institution.
While much has recently been written about risks resulting
from involvement in non-traditional investments, our experience
has been that managing exposure to credit risk remains the
predominant area of concern for most insured institutions.
Mismanagement of credit risk and resultant loss exposure is the
principal deficiency found in most of the 193 institutions (with
aggregate assets of $31 billion) on the FDIC's problem
institution list at year-end 1995. Credit risk also was the
primary cause leading to the failure of a majority of the
institutions that have failed since 1980. As a result, we
continue to devote substantial attention during the examination
process to the assessment of credit risk, including evaluation of
an institutions loan and credit administration policies,
underwriting practices, documentation and adequacy of allowances
for loan and lease losses.
In order to embrace a more proactive assessment of exposure
to and management of credit risks, beginning in early 1995 FDIC
examiners have been completing an "underwriting standards" survey
at each examination. The survey reflects an examiners view of
managements ability to identify, measure, monitor and control
credit risks in various types of lending. This focus on new loan
underwriting standards is designed to serve as an early-warning
mechanism for identifying future problems. The results of the
survey for 1995, which will be released shortly, should be
helpful to examiners and bankers in providing a framework for
discussion and feedback to bank management and boards of
directors. The survey will continue with 1995, a year of
substantial bank profitability, as the benchmark. The FDIC
expects to release the results semiannually in 1996 and
thereafter.
In addition to the traditional emphasis on assessment of
exposure to and management of credit and other risk, the FDIC
works to insure that adequate administration, supervision and
internal controls are in place to address new or changing risks.
These controls are essential to successful risk management in all
risk areas. FDIC examiners prepare a written assessment of an
institution's "Administration, Supervision and Controls" as part
of every examination report. The written assessment analyzes the
effectiveness of policies and procedures in twelve specific areas
(see Attachment A). This analysis enables examiners to arrive at
a prospective and proactive assessment of an institutions
policies and practices as administered by management and
supervised by the board of directors. The findings are shared
with an institutions management and board of directors.
The FDIC also utilizes offsite monitoring programs to
supplement and guide the onsite examination process. Monitoring
programs can provide an early indication that an institutions
risk profile may be changing. Offsite monitoring systems using quarterly Reports of Condition and Income data have been
developed to identify institutions that are experiencing rapid
loan growth or reporting unusual levels or trends in:
Volume of nonaccrual or delinquent loans;
Investment activities;
Off-balance-sheet transactions;
Earnings structure;
Funding strategies; and,
Capital levels.
In addition to these systems designed to "screen" banks for
"outliers," the FDIC uses the "Uniform Bank Performance Report"
(UBPR) for offsite monitoring. The UBPR is an analytical tool
incorporating data generated from quarterly Reports of Condition
and Income. The report presents information on: (1) the
individual banks financial reports and summary ratios; (2) a
peer group of banks similar in size and operating
characteristics; and, (3) percentile rankings that give an
indication of how high or low an institution's ratio is in
relation to its peer group. The FDIC also uses the Federal
Reserve System's "Bank Holding Company Performance Report"
(BHCPR) for ratio analysis of certain larger holding companies in
its offsite monitoring and pre-examination planning processes.
The FDIC's unique position as deposit insurer requires a
careful and continuing analysis of the condition and risk
profiles of all FDIC-insured institutions, in particular larger
insured institutions where the FDIC is not the primary federal
regulator. While there are only 582 insured institutions with
total assets of $1 billion or more, these institutions account
for 75 percent of the $5.3 trillion in total assets held by
insured institutions. For these reasons, the FDIC conducts
quarterly offsite reviews of each insured institution with $1
billion or more in total assets. These quarterly reviews involve
analysis of all available public and regulatory data, as well as
information that may be provided directly by the institution or
its auditors.
Internal and External Audits
The FDIC's risk assessment efforts are augmented by an
institution's own program of strong internal controls for
monitoring risk that includes effective internal and external
auditing programs. These programs provide an ongoing mechanism
to identify potential risks and possible problems at insured
institutions. Ideally, an institution's internal control and
audit program should enable it to detect and resolve its own
problems at an early stage. In addition, these programs are
designed to provide, particularly at larger and more complex
institutions, an ongoing, "arm's length" assessment of how
management is identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling
its risks.
Since the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), larger institutions
also have been required to have an annual external audit
performed by an independent public accountant. These annual
reports include a review of internal controls. The FDIC set the
threshold level for requiring an individual insured institution
to have an external audit at $500 million in total assets.
The FDIC's review of a depository institution's report on
internal controls with respect to financial reporting and the
accountants accompanying attestation as to the effectiveness of
such controls provide a useful assessment of the institution's
internal control system. Suggestions for improving controls are
often described in the "management letter" submitted by the
accountant to the institution. Our examiners evaluate these
reports and look for areas within an organization's control
structure where significant improvements are needed. As a result
of pre-examination reviews, examiners may decide to place greater
emphasis during the examination on reviewing an institutions
internal control system and audit workpapers.
Using the methods described above, the FDIC works with
institutions on an ongoing basis to identify and address any
weaknesses that may exist in their internal systems and controls.
When necessary, informal and formal corrective programs also are
used to obtain the appropriate commitment from boards of
directors and management to address an institution's problems.
These corrective programs may address specific problems at
individual institutions to assure that adequate internal controls
are in place to monitor risks or to reduce excessive risks.
Informal corrective programs, most frequently memoranda of
understanding between the FDIC and an institution's board of
directors, are appropriate if problems are recognized by the
institution's management and there is confidence that good-faith
efforts will be initiated to correct deficiencies. If stronger
corrective action is necessary, the FDIC implements more formal
actions, including cease-and-desist orders, capital directives
and prompt corrective action directives, and suspension and
removal actions that prohibit bank officers and directors or
others from participating in a financial institutions affairs.
Supervisory agencies also can impose fines on financial
institutions and individuals for failure to comply with cease-
and-desist orders or certain rules and regulations. Close
supervision of problem institutions and the use of these
corrective actions can reduce the level of anticipated losses
arising from poor risk management.
Effective board and senior management oversight of an
institution's risk is the cornerstone of sound risk management.
With respect to Barings and Daiwa, there were clearly failures of
internal control systems in the respective banks, which permitted
the same employees to engage in trading activities and settle
trades, thereby putting these employees in the position to be
able to conceal trading losses. In addition, in the case of Daiwa,
and probably also Barings, there was not an effective
internal audit program. The FDIC's method of examination
encourages bank examiners to evaluate all potential risks --
including those involving failures of internal controls and
procedures -- and is intended to detect the types of problems
exposed by Barings and Daiwa. We are nevertheless evaluating
whether our examiners should engage in greater use of audit
procedures in order to obtain external confirmations of a sample
of trading activity during examinations of active trading
departments. Such an enhancement of examination procedures would
add to examination time and would increase the level of
regulatory burden on institutions, so we are weighing this course
of action very carefully. Regardless of these efforts, however,
where fraud or collusion are contributing factors, control
weaknesses are much more difficult to detect.
Risk-Based Premiums
In January 1993, the FDIC implemented a risk-based deposit
insurance premium system that charges premium rates based on an
insured institutions risk profile. The previous statutorily
mandated flat-rate deposit insurance pricing structure provided
an inherent inducement for increased risk-taking. The current
risk-based assessment system more accurately quantifies the risks
posed to the insurance funds. It rewards well-managed and well-
capitalized institutions with lower premiums and, conversely,
provides a strong financial incentive for institutions that are
not well-managed and well capitalized to improve their management
and operations.
For purposes of risk-based premiums, the FDIC evaluates an
insured institution's risk profile using both objective and
subjective factors, including the institution's capital level and
the FDIC's supervisory judgment of the risks that the institution
poses to the insurance funds. Each insured institution is
assigned to one of three capital groups and one of three
supervisory risk subgroups. The evaluations made by an
institution's primary federal regulator are considered in
conjunction with other relevant information. Each institution's
risk classification is evaluated semi-annually when premium rates
are reset. The implementation of the risk-based premium system
introduced a significant new dimension to bank supervision,
directly linking the institution's deposit insurance costs to its
capital level and supervisory rating.
Measuring and Monitoring Capital
Together with the other federal banking regulators, the FDIC
has adopted capital regulations that require institutions to have
greater amounts of capital as the level of their risk increases.
Off-balance-sheet activity also is considered in the risk-based
capital assessment. If an institution's capital falls to
inadequate levels, restrictions or corrective actions are
required. Attachment B describes regulatory efforts to address
both interest rate risk and market risk in the risk-based capital
standards. In addition, existing capital standards require that,
regardless of an institution's risk profile, an adequate amount
of leverage capital be maintained in order to provide a minimum
cushion against insolvency.
The federal banking regulators recently proposed new rules
to require banks with large trading portfolios to project their
future trading losses more accurately. Under the proposal, banks
will have to compare past estimates of market risk with actual
results -- a process known as "backtesting." Banks that have
been inaccurate in predicting market risks could be required to
increase their capital levels. The goal of "backtesting" is to
give banks incentives for understanding and addressing market
risks without creating undue regulatory burdens. This proposal
was developed in coordination with the OCC and the Federal
Reserve Board. The FDIC has issued a proposed rule on this
process; the OCC and the Federal Reserve are expected to issue
similar proposals in the near future.
Finally, the banking regulators are working on an
interagency and international basis to include other risks in the
risk-based capital equation. Particular attention is being given
to addressing interest rate risk and market risk in the risk-
based capital standards. The Capital Accord of 1988 issued by
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee),
addressed some of the changes taking place in the financial
industry by establishing minimum capital standards that apply to
all internationally active banks. The resultant risk-based
capital rules adopted by the FDIC and other U.S. regulators apply
risk-weights based on potential credit risks posed by balance-
sheet assets and certain off-balance-sheet items.
Interagency Efforts to Improve the CAMEL Rating System
In light of the developments discussed above, and in
recognition of the renewed emphasis that must be placed on
management's ability to assess and manage its own risk,
interagency efforts are underway to improve the CAMEL rating
system. (note 4) The current CAMEL system has served as a
reasonably accurate measure of the condition of individual
institutions and of the banking and thrift industries in general.
It is understood by the banking industry and provides a framework
within which institutions can understand the nature and scope of
their risks. As such, it has aided the FDIC in making
determinations about the adequacy of the insurance funds relative
to industry conditions. However, the CAMEL rating system has its
limitations. For example, CAMEL ratings track rather than lead
changes in bank condition. As such, the lead time in failure
predictions is not as great as we would like, as demonstrated by
the fact that 47 percent of banks that failed between 1980 and
1994 were rated CAMEL "1" or "2" within two years prior to
failure.
Another limitation is the fact that the management component
can simply become the average of other components, rather than an
assessment of management risk itself. Moreover, risk analysis
can vary by examiner, field office, regional office, and across
banking agencies. For these reasons, the federal regulators are
looking at what we can do to build a better CAMEL. Clearly, an
improved CAMEL will have more formal, explicit, and consistent
indicators than the components currently have.
Proposed changes to the current rating system likely will
expand the current number of component rating factors to
recognize more fully the industry's new and emerging activities
and risk areas and increase the attention paid to the adequacy of
risk management. In addition, enhancements to the system will
describe risk factors more completely, add greater clarity to
risk assessment, and provide additional guidance on the existing
components to assure that they incorporate both a present and
prospective consideration of risk. When finalized, a revised
system will provide a better indication of a specific
institution's condition. We envision an enhanced rating system
that will improve regulatory communication with bank boards of
directors, and one that will be a better prediction model for
estimating the likely future condition of insured institutions on
an industry-wide basis.
In addition to enhancing the existing CAMEL rating system,
we believe the process would be more effective if examiners
disclose to the examined institution the individual component
ratings of CAMEL along with the composite rating. Federal
regulators currently disclose only the composite rating, not the
separate individual component ratings. However, twelve state
authorities have disclosed the component ratings for some time
with positive results. Providing management and boards of
directors with each of the CAMEL component ratings would improve
communication between bankers and examiners by assuring that
emerging problems and risk perspectives are fully identified and
communicated at an early stage. In addition, requiring examiners
to disclose the components of the CAMEL rating to a bank's
management and board of directors may provide additional
discipline to the individual component ratings. A great benefit
would be that weakness in a component, whether in actual
performance or in potential risk, could be communicated earlier
to an institution's management through disclosure of the CAMEL
components, rather than when a lowering of the overall composite
rating occurs. We plan to pursue disclosure of individual CAMEL
components with our regulatory counterparts.
Other Initiatives
Other ongoing initiatives that are designed to enhance the
traditional examination and supervisory processes and assist the
FDIC in identifying, measuring and monitoring risk include:
Development of a graduated approach to risk assessment in
examinations through the use of "decision charts" for
examiners in each major risk area
As discussed above, the FDIC seeks to avoid a strict "check
list" approach to examinations and other forms of risk
assessment. We will continue to stress examiner judgment.
However, we recognize that each institution is unique with
differing levels and types of risk. In order to improve the
structure and consistency of the examination process, a graduated
approach to risk assessment in examinations is being taken
through the development of "decision flow charts" for examiners
for each major risk area. These decision flow charts aid
examiners at critical junctures in their inquiry and decision-
making process by helping to identify the types of risk that may
exist in a particular institution and providing the examiners
with possible information sources, both macro and micro, to
address those identified risks.
Examiners will use these charts to enhance our graduated
approach to risk assessment. The decision charts -- for credit risk,
interest rate risk, operational risk, and so on -- outline
a diagnostic process. This involves a graduated approach to
examinations based upon the level of risk at the institution --
on a risk-by-risk basis. If no symptoms are found in one risk
area, the examiner will shift attention to the next area. The
charts are a tool that will lead to more analytical and more
fact-based decision-making. In short, using this approach, the
scope and focus of our bank examinations will become more a flow
of risk assessments and evaluations -- some based on economic
data and all based on the individual facts of each financial
institution. Attachment C shows a draft risk assessment decision
chart that we are considering to assist us in our evaluation of
interest rate risk.
Selection of "case managers" to consolidate analysis and
communication
The FDIC is currently reorganizing its examination
operations to create "case manager" positions through which
report review, offsite analysis and application processing for
each individual institution or banking company will be
centralized. This initiative is designed to result in risk
analysis that is more effective and timely by centralizing the
overall analytical responsibility in one case manager. The case
managers will become the authority on a given banking
organization and will be responsible for its risk analysis
regardless of its regional or geographic boundaries. The case
managers also will serve as the initial contacts within the FDIC
for a bank's management. Through this process, an individual
banking organization's unique risk profile will be more fully
assessed in a comprehensive manner and in coordination with other
banking agencies.
Enhancement of examiner access to databases and automation
of major portions of the examination process and report
preparation
The FDIC also is expanding examiner access to internal and
external agency databases to enhance pre-examination planning and
provide for increased and more timely offsite analysis. Offsite
data and information will allow us to target more efficiently
risk issues for onsite review and to tailor the time each
examiner spends in an institution to the level of risk presented
by the institution. We also are reviewing comprehensive risk-
analysis models that have been designed and implemented by some
of the leading companies in the financial area. These models may
offer tools that can be incorporated into the examination process
to enhance the measurement of risks and allow examiners to
perform their work more efficiently. In addition, we are
increasing our use of technology to improve the efficiency of
examinations through the development of an automated examination
package that allows examiners to do a significant amount of
analysis off-site, increasing the efficiency and rigor of time
spent in an institution. The new automated package is currently
being field-tested and is expected to be implemented early next
year.
Risk assessment training
FDIC examiners continue to receive extensive training in a
variety of courses that address the assessment of risk, including
financial analysis, credit risk assessment, financial institution
analysis, capital markets issues and other emerging issues. In
addition, the FDIC sponsors seminars related to risk management
issues. For example, a recent Capital Markets Symposium on
derivatives was attended by regulators, industry representatives
and Congressional staff. A video of the symposium will be made
available to all FDIC field offices.
Development of risk specialists
The FDIC is developing and training risk specialists in
emerging risk areas, including capital markets investments,
accounting, sales of nondeposit investment products and interest
rate risk. These specialists assist other examiners in analyzing
complex transactions and activities.
For example, in response to the growth and increasing
complexity of risks, the FDIC created a unit of capital markets
specialists that includes individuals with extensive banking
industry and trading experience as well as examination skills.
This unit is charged with three primary responsibilities: to
provide input on supervisory policy development in the capital
markets related risk areas; to provide training to supervisory
examination personnel; and to provide technical support to the
FDIC examiners as they encounter unique securities as part of
their day-to-day examination function. These specialists also
provide a central reference point for complex regulatory and
supervisory issues raised by the capital markets activities of
insured institutions. They respond to the questions examiners
raise in the course of examinations of institutions with exposure
to capital markets instruments.
Through this group, the FDIC has issued guidance to assist
examiners and bankers in assessing risks in complex derivatives,
developing prudent investment policies and strategies and other
guidance that addresses the risks associated with capital markets
activities, mortgage derivative securities, structured notes, and
interest-rate risk exposure. For example, on April 26, 1994, we
issued guidance that discussed the seven fundamental risks in
derivative financial instruments, namely: market risk,
counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk, operating risk, legal
risk, settlement risk and interconnection risk. These guidelines
provide our examiners with the framework for assessing risks
associated with these complex capital markets instruments.
Attachment D defines these risks and describes the FDIC's
announcements and guidance letters relating to capital markets
issues.
Study of emerging technologies and electronic banking
While the full spectrum of risks resulting from new
electronic banking and financial delivery systems are not yet
known, the FDIC has established a New Technologies Task Force and
chairs an interagency working group on electronic banking. These
groups were created to work on analyzing many of the issues
presented by new and emerging technologies. These efforts ensure
proper coordination among the regulatory agencies as well as help
the FDIC review issues that are critical to its own functions,
such as deposit insurance coverage, insolvency and settlement
risk, and consumer protection and disclosure issues. The FDIC
also has established examiner training programs to expand our
knowledge with respect to electronic banking issues and will be
conducting a joint examination with the OTS of an existing
"virtual bank" and with the OCC of a large data servicer that
provides home banking services. The FDIC also will host a
symposium on electronic banking on April 29, 1996, that will be
sponsored by the Information Systems Subcommittee of the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council. This symposium will
address on-line banking concerns and will include other financial
institution regulators and industry experts.
Expansion of risk assessment efforts in the area of
international banking
The FDIC also is expanding and strengthening its ability to
assess risks inherent in international banking activities. We
are centralizing our in-house expertise in this area in order to
assure greater coordination in assessing the nature and impact of
these risks. This program will be staffed with examiners
experienced in international banking matters. The unit will
provide structure and consistency for the oversight of
international banking operations. In addition, we are working
with other U.S. and foreign regulators and supervisors to develop
more coordinated supervisory strategies to respond to risks in
international banking. An example of this coordination is the
joint adoption with the other U.S. bank regulators of a revised
program to analyze and rate foreign banking organizations that
have a U.S. presence.
CONCLUSION
The financial services industry is undergoing fundamental
and structural changes with respect to the nature and scope of
risk. Non-bank competition, industry consolidation, product
innovations, and emerging technologies are increasing the
complexity and volatility of risk in the industry. The FDIC is
prepared to deal with these changes. Extensive studies and
projects are underway to enhance our existing risk assessment and
monitoring programs and to bridge the gap between the macro and
micro elements of these programs at the FDIC.
Common sense is shaping the FDIC's approach to risk
assessment. The FDIC is leveraging its analytic and statistical
resources to bridge the gap between the macro-economic analysis
and the micro-examination of financial institutions. While in
the past the regulatory agencies have found it difficult to
bridge this gap -- we are seeking ways to translate data into
directions that examiners can use in institutions with differing
levels and types of risk exposures, while assuring communication
from examiners to financial analysts and economists on findings
in individual institutions.
We also have a number of initiatives underway to prepare us
to meet the challenges of future innovations in products and
technology, including the use of automated pre-examination and
onsite examination packages; development of our graduated
approach to risk assessment in examinations; creation of risk
specialists and case managers; and improvements to the CAMEL
rating system.
These initiatives are not designed to abandon or to alter
dramatically our traditional examination philosophy, policies or
procedures. We have found that risks are not always precisely
quantifiable for each and every banking activity, and nothing
will ultimately replace examiner judgment. We are, therefore,
strengthening and building on our existing procedures so that we
can conduct a more thorough assessment of an institution's
ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control risk. Where
we are headed is toward a more diagnostic approach to bank
examinations -- a combination of observation with factual
findings from our analytical and technological innovations. It
is our intention that the result will be a more effective and
accurate assessment program within a structured framework that
promotes discussion of specific strengths, weaknesses, and
possible improvements with management and boards of directors.
It is our goal that this kind of communication will keep banks
open and operating safely and soundly. This goal, rather than
closing failed banks, is the mission of the FDIC as insurer of
bank deposits.
This heightened emphasis on risk assessment is not new to us
at the FDIC. We have always supported safe and sound supervisory
efforts that focus on identifying risks and their underlying
causes within the CAMEL rating system. We are discovering that
the underlying risks in banking, even the new "emerging" ones,
remain largely unchanged, but technological and other innovations
in products and the delivery of services have vastly accelerated
the flow of risks through the system. Whether we encounter the
familiar risks that continue to travel through traditional brick-
and-mortar institutions located on the main streets of small
towns of our nation, or we evaluate the banking technological
super-highways, we continue to stand prepared to assure structure
and consistency in our efforts to identify, measure, monitor and
help control risks in the banking system.
(note 1) For a description of the current CAMEL system and the
proposed interagency efforts to improve that system, see pages
22-25.
(note 2) Beginning in March 1995, the FDIC initiated a banker
outreach program to solicit bankers' opinions and suggestions on
how to improve the quality and efficiency of our examination
process. Approximately 95 percent of the respondents stated that
examiners focused on the appropriate risk areas. In addition, 91
percent of the respondents indicated that pre-examination
preparations and requests for information made by examiners
enabled the examination to be conducted efficiently. This is an
ongoing program that surveys banks as a follow-up to each
examination.
(note 3) Examples of this data include: the CAEL Offsite
Monitoring System (an acronym for four components of CAMEL --
capital, asset quality, earning performance and liquidity) that
compares financial ratios and trends in Reports of Condition and
Income to the findings of previous examination reports; the
Uniform Bank Performance Report; financial analysis reports; and
independent audit reports.
(note 4) On November 26, 1979, the FDIC adopted the "Uniform
Financial Institutions Rating System" commonly referred to as the
CAMEL rating system. The CAMEL rating system also was adopted by
the other federal banking regulators. Each financial institution
is assigned a uniform composite rating based on an evaluation of
pertinent financial and operational standards, criteria and
principles. Underlying the composite rating is an assessment and
rating of five essential components of each institution's
operations: adequacy of capital; quality of assets; ability and
performance of management and administration; quantity and
quality of earnings; and the level of liquidity. The composite
and component ratings use a numerical scale of "1" through "5",
with "1" indicating strength and "5" indicating the lowest, most
critically deficient level of performance and the highest degree
of supervisory concern.
ATTACHMENT A:
Administration, Supervision, and Control Assessment
The Administration, Supervision, and Control Schedule of the
FDIC's Report of Examination provides a forward-looking
assessment by the examiners of twelve primary areas of
institution management and administration. The schedule assesses
the following primary administration, supervision, and control
areas:
- Loan policies and practices, including underwriting and
credit administration procedures.
- Loan review systems and methodology for determining the
adequacy of the allowance for loan and lease losses.
- Asset/liability management policies and administration
(including liquidity and funding strategies, interest rate
risk and investment guidelines).
- Strategic planning and budgeting practices.
- Internal controls, information systems, and internal audit
programs.
- External audit programs (independence, scope, and
frequency).
- Management's response to supervisory recommendations, as
well as, knowledge and understanding of governing laws and
regulations.
- Ownership and control structure.
- Holding company and/or affiliate relationships (and adverse
trends regarding dividends, fees, or other financial
dealings).
- Type and extent of insider activity and dealings.
- Information systems.
Findings of the examination review of the Bank Secrecy Act
activities, lease obligations, fidelity insurance coverage,
interbank liabilities, wire transfer, regulatory report
errors, frequency of board of directors at meetings, and
other issues.
ATTACHMENT B:
RISK-BASED CAPITAL
The FDIC is working with other regulators both domestically
and internationally to factor both interest rate risk and market
risk into the risk-based capital standards. These efforts are
described below:
Interest Rate Risk
FDICIA requires the federal banking agencies to revise their
risk-based capital standards to include consideration of interest
rate risk, concentrations of credit risk and the risks of
nontraditional activities. FDICIA and changing practices in
capital markets and banking have increased the FDIC's emphasis on
interest rate risk management. The FDIC Board approved a final
rule amending the risk-based capital regulation effective
September 1, 1995.
Also, in August 1995, the FDIC published a proposed joint
agency supervisory policy statement describing a method to
measure interest rate risk for regulatory purposes. The Federal
Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC are
currently evaluating the industry's reaction to the proposed
policy statement and the current technology in the marketplace.
As part of the examination process, the agencies will continue to
monitor the measurement of interest rate risk and individual
banks for purposes of assuring the adequacy of capital levels.
These interagency efforts for assuring the adequacy of interest
rate risk assessments for capital purposes will continue.
Market Risk
The FDIC issued Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk
("market risk proposal") jointly with the other federal banking
agencies in July 1995. This market risk proposal sets forth
methods and standards for measuring, monitoring and controlling
the risks present in the securities and derivatives trading
activities of banks. A revised proposal will be issued for
comment jointly by the federal banking supervisors early in 1996.
The market risk proposal is related to the Basle Committee
proposal to coordinate on an international basis the capital
standards and supervision of bank securities and derivatives
trading operations. The FDIC has actively participated in
several Basle Committee working groups charged with developing
international standards for bank risk management. The FDIC also
has actively participated in the development of the market risk
proposal issued by the federal banking agencies.
The Basle Committee has completed its work on the evaluation
of market risk -- that is, exposure to the risk of price changes
in the marketplace for traded debt securities, traded equities,
and foreign-exchange positions. U.S. regulators have requested
comments on a proposed rule that would establish a risk-based
capital requirement for market risk in foreign exchange,
commodity activities and in the trading of debt and equity
instruments. Consistent with international agreements,
implementation of a capital requirement for market risks will be
effective at the end of 1997.
ATTACHMENT C: available from FDIC Public Information Center,
801 17th Street N.W., Room 100, Washington, DC, 20434,
phone (202) 416-6940.
ATTACHMENT D:
CAPITAL MARKETS
The FDIC, on April 26, 1994, issued guidance on financial
derivatives and provided the following definitions on the seven
risks encountered in financial derivatives.
There are seven fundamental risks inherent in financial
derivative instruments and off-balance sheet activities. Most of
these are present in varying degrees in more traditional
financial institution products and activities, and can largely be
assessed and evaluated in similar fashion. The complexity of
financial derivatives is largely due to the manner in which these
risks are combined, the difficulty in determining market values
and the speed with which external market forces can affect the
activity.
Market Risk
Market risk is generally broadly defined as the risk that a
derivative instrument will lose value due to a change in the
price of an underlying instrument, an index of financial
instruments, or various interest rates. The three principal
market risks are price risk, interest rate risk and basis
risk.
Price risk is generally a function of the price of the
underlying instrument. Changes in the price of the
underlying instrument affect the value of the associated
financial contract varying in extent with the
characteristics of the instrument and the derivative.
Interest rate risk is caused by changes in the level of
current or expected future market interest rates, and the
relationship between these rates over future periods (the
yield curve). Basis risk results from the use of two or
more instruments with different rate indices, which change
at different speeds or are subject to different market
forces.
Counterparty Credit Risk
This is the risk of default by a counterparty unwilling or
unable to meet the terms of the contract, exposing the
holder of the in-the-money position to the cost of replacing
the favorable contract under present market conditions. The
amount of credit risk is the cost of replacement by an
identical contract, also known as the current exposure of
the contract, and is established by assessing the current
market value of the contract as opposed to the value at
inception.
Exchange traded instruments (futures, options, and options
on futures) are marked to market, either at the end of each
trading day or on an intra-day basis, by the exchange
clearinghouse. Changes in the value of positions are
received from or paid by the participants on a daily basis.
All participants are required to post a performance bond or
collateral with the exchange, to minimize credit risk, in
the event of failure of the exchange.
Liquidity Risk
Product liquidity risk exists to the degree that an
instrument cannot be obtained, closed out or disposed of
rapidly at, or very close to, economic value. The liquidity
of financial derivative markets changes gradually over time
as products or usage evolves, but can also fluctuate rapidly
in times of market stress. In some markets liquidity can
vary over the course of the day.
For most derivative instruments, established secondary
markets exist with a large number of participating
counterparties ensuring liquidity under normal market
conditions. However, the use of uniquely tailored or more
thinly traded products raises the possibility that a
sufficient number of contracts or willing counterparties may
become unavailable in periods of market stress.
In addition to product liquidity risk, termination and close
out, or collateral requirement provisions contained in many
derivative contracts, particularly OTC instruments, may
require an institution to meet unexpected cash flow or asset
pledging requirements. While the individual amounts
required will normally be only a fraction of the notional
value of these contracts, a large number of contracts with
the same counterparty or subject to the same market risks,
may expose an institution to substantial collateral demands.
Operating Risk
Operating risk is the possibility that inadequate internal
controls or procedures, human error, system failure or fraud
can result in unexpected losses. Operating risk can result
in unanticipated open positions, credit exposures in excess
of established ability to confirm performance limits, or
fraud.
Legal Risk
Legal risk is raised by the possibility that a court ruling
or litigation, will preclude contractual performance.
Settlement Risk
Settlement risk, which typically lasts for only a short
time, is the exposure to loss of delivering funds or assets
before receiving the proceeds specified in the contract, and
the counterparty is subsequently either unable or unwilling
to perform. Settlement risk may exist as a result of the
time differences between foreign counter parties, when
delivery is not synchronized with payment, or when the
method of payment creates a delay in receiving funds.
Aggregation or Interconnection Risk
This risk is a result of the manner in which positions in or
values of any one derivative instrument are directly or
indirectly tied to a number of other positions on or off the
balance sheet. These interconnections, sometimes referred
to as "multi-legged positions", frequently involve both
cross-border and cross-market links and a wide range of
individual financial instruments.
This interconnection or aggregation of risks gives rise to
the possibility of systemic disruptions; that a single
market event (the failure of a firm, disruption of a market,
or collapse of a payment system) will, as a result of the
widespread use of derivatives, cause the subsequent failure,
disruption, or collapse of other firms, markets or payment
systems.
FDIC's guidance to examiners and insured institutions has
been developed to address the risks of capital markets
activities, mortgage derivative securities, structured notes, and
interest rate risk exposure. Listed below are some of our
prominent guidance announcements:
Revised Supervisory Guidance for Analyzing and Classifying
Mortgage Derivative Products (FIL 82-94, RD 94-159) was
produced in December 1994. The document updates examiner
guidance due to the introduction of Financial Accounting
Standard Number 115.
Examination Guidance for Structured Notes (FIL 61-94, RD 94-
130) was released in August 1994. This letter contains
supervisory guidance and examination treatment for
structured notes, which are instruments that can have many
of the same risks as off-balance sheet instruments or
mortgage derivative securities.
Assessment of Interest Rate Risk (FIL 60-94, RD 94-121) was
distributed in August 1994 and provides guidance for bankers
and examiners to assess interest rate risk and interest rate
risk management in financial institutions. The assessment
of interest rate risk encompasses policies, procedures and
strategies as risk measurements systems. The treatment of
risk measurement systems includes measurement methodology,
system inputs and outputs, and risk exposure evaluations.
Examination Guidance for Financial Derivatives (FIL 34-94,
RD 94-059) was released in May 1994. This document presents
seven fundamental risks in derivative financial instruments:
market risk, counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk,
operating risk, legal risk, settlement risk and
interconnection risk. The letter includes the supervisory
policy for the evaluation of derivative instruments.
Expanded Guidance on the Treatment of Mortgage Derivative
Products (FIL 64-92, RD 92-69) was distributed in September
1992. The document focused on the treatment of high-risk
mortgage derivatives and established a test for such
instruments.
|